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Sometimes it takes an outsider to make us see ourselves.  We often take our history, culture, and traditions for granted.  In 
many instances, it is only when an outsider asks 
for clarification that we realize how much we 
have subconsciously assumed about ourselves 
and about our way of life.
This point was brought home to me recently 
by one of my colleagues at Western Kentucky 
University.  In 2009, Haiwang Yuan, the 
library’s Webmaster, was selected by the In-
stitute for Museum and Library Services to 
participate in a panel of U.S. librarians helping 
to train library science students and practitioners 
in China.  After responding to audience ques-
tions, Haiwang sent me the following email:
Q.  What’s the legal basis for monitoring 
the library with security cameras such 
as those installed [at Western Kentucky 
University]?  We don’t agree even among 
the speakers ourselves here, not to speak 
of the audience.
This is one of those basic questions that we 
almost never think about.  The short answer 
is that if a person is in a public or semi-public 
place such as a library, his or her movements 
are not subject to a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.  A library employee doesn’t need a 
search warrant if he or she observes someone 
stealing a book.  There is not a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in the person’s movements. 
An employee or police officer could follow a 
library patron around the library to see if he or 
she is stealing books, but this is not practical to 
do all the time.  The security camera is simply a 
technologically enhanced version of following 
a person around.
As Americans, we tend to take this for grant-
ed.  Every store has a security system.  Many 
cities have mounted cameras to catch drivers 
who run stoplights.  And, of course, 
many libraries use video surveil-
lance.  But what is the actual legal 
basis for this practice?  Where 
does it come from, and why 
is it legal?  The answer to the 
question is much more difficult 
than it would appear, because so 
much of the answer depends upon 
an assumed understanding of the 
Anglo-American Legal System. 
There are a number of different legal sys-
tems in place in the world, but most countries 
fall either into one of two categories.  One is 
called the “Common Law” or “Anglo-Ameri-
can” system, and the other main type is called 
the “Civil Law” system.  In the Civil Law sys-
tem, laws that are passed are very specific and 
very detailed.  A judge can only enforce what is 
actually found within the actual language of the 
statute.  He or she has no power to interpret or to 
“apply” the statute to specific situations. 
The Civil Law system involves positive 
prescriptions and negative proscriptions, all 
spelled out very specifically.  In a Civil Law 
system, the legislature could specifically grant 
stores and libraries the right to use video sur-
veillance.  This would be a prescriptive use of 
legal power.  A proscriptive use would be a 
law making it illegal to use video surveillance 
in public.
In the U.S. legal system, however, case law 
and the judiciary are as important as statutes and 
regulations.  However, the Common Law or 
Anglo-American system is very different.  Laws 
are much less specific in their language.  While 
many laws are still prescriptive or proscriptive, 
there is also a great deal of latitude in between 
with room for interpretation.
In the early centuries of the Common Law 
system, judges made all laws; that is why it is 
called “common” law (as opposed to legislative 
law).  The idea of parliaments, legislatures, or 
congress passing a statue was an innovation. 
In fact, many of the statutes have now codified 
the original Common Law rules.  The power of 
judges to create rules was further constrained 
in the U.S. by the language of the Constitu-
tion.  Indeed, the reasoning involved in passing 
statutes is very different due to the enhanced 
role of the common law judiciary.1  However, 
modern Anglo-American judges still retain 
the superior power of interpreting the 
statutes, or in the U.S. of declaring 
a statute unconstitutional.
In contrast, it is very rare for 
a statute to be found unconsti-
tutional in Civil Law systems. 
Often Civil Law countries have 
special constitutional courts 
that can adjudicate these kinds 
of cases. In the ordinary courts, 
the legislature is superior, and the role of the 
judge is to apply the law the legislature has 
written.  Here is a basic explanation of the 
differences between Civil Law and Common 
Law systems:
Civil-law countries have comprehensive 
codes, often developed from a single 
drafting event.  The codes cover an 
abundance of legal topics, sometimes 
treating separately private law, criminal 
law, and commercial law.  While com-
mon-law countries have statutes in those 
areas, sometimes collected into codes, 
they have been derived more from an ad 
hoc process over many years.  Moreover, 
codes of common-law countries very 
often reflect the rules of law enunciated 
in judicial decisions (i.e., they are the 
statutory embodiment of rules developed 
through the judicial decision-making 
process).2
Common Law judges don’t pull their inter-
pretations out from thin air.  They are bound by 
previous decisions of higher courts.  If a court 
has ruled that a statute is to be interpreted in a 
particular way, any courts that are lower must 
follow that decision.  This is called “Stare 
decisis,” and comes from the Latin phrase 
Stare decisis et non quieta movere, “to stand 
by things decided.”3
Because the courts are an equal branch 
with the legislature in the U.S., anything that 
is not specifically prohibited by the state or 
Federal constitution is allowed.  Congress or 
the state legislature could prohibit the use of 
security cameras.  However, they have never 
done so.  Similarly, a judge could interpret 
an existing law or constitutional provision to 
prohibit security cameras.  However, no judge 
has ever done so.
For example, the Federal and state govern-
ments have both passed laws prohibiting some-
one from recording a telephone conversation 
without permission.  (This is called “wiretap-
ping.”)4  The rationale for prohibiting wiretap-
ping is related to keeping the government from 
intruding into someone’s privacy.  Thus, the 
government (by virtue of the 4th Amendment) 
can’t record a conversation unless a judge has 
issued a search warrant.5
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Part of the rationale for prohibiting secret recordings by individuals 
under the wiretapping law is that they could turn information over to the 
government as an informant, circumventing the requirements of the 4th 
Amendment.  Or the individual could do other prohibited things with the 
information, such as blackmail.6
However, there are no prohibitions against using a security camera. 
Because there is no prohibition, cameras are allowed for surveillance pur-
poses.  Congress or the state legislature could pass a law tomorrow making 
it illegal, and we would have to turn off the cameras. However, until that 
happens, it is legal to use a camera.
Part of the distinction between recording a conversation and recording a 
person’s movements has to do with the legal concept of “expectation of pri-
vacy.” Judges have interpreted the 4th Amendment as providing citizens with 
an expectation of privacy.  This is not found anywhere in the words of the 4th 
Amendment, but is entirely judge-made law.  The 4th Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.7
Beginning in the mid-20th-century, judges have interpreted this provision 
as creating a reasonable expectation of privacy that a person has in his or 
her own house.8  A person should not have to look over their shoulder when 
they are at home, in their car, at the office, etc.  However, if the person does 
something in plain view of the police, he or she is fair game.9
Suppose the police believe that George is smoking marijuana.  They can’t 
put a camera in his house or his car —or search his house or car — unless 
they have convinced a judge to issue a search warrant.  The judge can’t is-
sue a search warrant unless there is probable cause to believe that George 
has committed a crime.
However, if the police see George smoking marijuana in plain view (for 
example, on the street in front of the police station) they don’t need a search 
warrant.  This is called the “plain view” doctrine.10  Judges have interpreted 
the plain view doctrine as meaning that if a police officer is walking past 
George’s car and sees George smoking marijuana through the window, 
he or she does not need a search warrant.  In fact, if the crime occurred in 
plain view, this can also provide the necessary probable cause to get a search 
warrant for George’s car.  George may have an expectation of privacy in 
his car, but if he committed a crime that was visible through the window 
his privacy expectation is not “reasonable.”11
The issue of reasonable expectation of privacy and plain view relates 
back to our original question of the legality of security cameras for surveil-
lance.  If the person is in a public or semi-public place such as a library, his 
or her movements are not subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
(Someone may expect privacy, but that is not reasonable.)
For example, a library employee doesn’t need a search warrant if he or 
she observes someone stealing a book.  There is not a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the person’s movements.  An employee or police officer could 
follow a library patron around the library to see if he or she is stealing books, 
but this is not practical to do all the time.  The security camera is simply a 
technologically enhanced version of following a person around.
The surveillance issue is different from the question of what books 
have been borrowed by a specific person.  With only two exceptions, every 
state or territory in the U.S. has made it illegal to disclose which books a 
library patron has borrowed unless a judge has issued a search warrant for 
probable cause.12  In fact, this reasonable expectation of privacy was behind 
protests over the PATRIOT Act before it was rewritten.13  (Actually, there 
were also serious constitutional issues over the meaning of probable cause, 
First Amendment freedom of speech, and even judicial oversight of search 
warrants.  So the PATRIOT Act raised a fair number of questions beyond 
the issue of borrowed books.)14
A library patron has a reasonable expectation of privacy in what they 
read.  This comes from these statutes.  However, an FBI agent could follow 
someone around the library and look over the person’s shoulder as he or she 
opens books.  That is perfectly legal.  The security camera is simply a tech-
nologically enhanced version of following a person around.  And that is the 
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